One of the recognized principal issues brought along by the steadfast migration towards power electronic interfaced energy sources is the loss of rotational inertia. In conventional power systems, the inertia of the synchronous machines plays a crucial role of safeguarding against any drastic variations in frequency by acting as a buffer in the event of large and sudden power generation-demand imbalances. In future power electronic based power systems, the same role can be played by strategically located virtual inertia devices. However, the question looms large as to how the system operators would procure and pay for these devices. In this article, we propose a market mechanism inspired by the ancillary service markets in power supply. We consider a linear network-reduced power system model along with a robust H 2 performance metric penalizing the worst-case primary control effort. With a social welfare maximization problem for the system operator as benchmark, we construct a market mechanism in which bids are invited from agents providing virtual inertia, who in turn are compensated via a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. The resulting mechanism ensures truthful bidding to be the dominant bidding strategy and guarantees non-negative payoffs for the agents. A three-region case study is considered in simulations, and a comparison with a regulatory approach to the same problem is presented.
Introduction
The significance of the role that the inertia of large rotating synchronous machines played in conventional power grids has come to the fore once again. There has been a concerted effort to phase out fossil fuel based generation in favour of power electronic interfaced solar and wind based renewable generation. However, such a transition has been accompanied by a rise in the instances of reported grid frequency violations [1] . The low system inertia is ill-equipped to arrest large frequency swings caused by power imbalances. Among the numerous attempts carried out to address this issue of loss of inertia, a considerable focus is beThis material is supported by ETH start-up funds, the SNF Assistant Professor Energy Grant #160573, NSF CAREER 1553407, NSF 1608509, and ARPA-E NODES.
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ing directed at virtual inertia emulation. The key feature of such a scheme is mimicking the effect that the rotational inertia in traditional generation had on the grid. This is achieved through advanced control strategies and state-ofthe-art power electronic devices [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Previously, studies have been conducted [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] to ascertain the impact of spatial arrangement of these virtual inertia devices. A performance metric accounting for frequency violations due to possible disturbances is adopted for this purpose. The location of these devices across the grid, significantly alters the system response to disturbances, and the optimal placement is found to heavily depend on the expected disturbance profile of the fluctuations that the grid may experience [7] . However, the associated economics of such an integration has not received adequate attention. The pricing and payment of synchronous inertia finds a mention in [13] . The AEMC (Australian Energy Market Commission) security market report [14] recommends virtual inertia provision by transmission operators and introducing market-sourcing mechanisms to this end.
The objective of this study is to identify potential conflicts arising due to the interaction between multiple noncooperative stakeholders, e.g., end-consumers, transmission system operators, renewable energy source providers, etc., and propose plausible solutions which safeguard individual interests. To this end, the problems of provisioning of virtual inertia units and the affiliated payment architecture are considered within the framework of ancillary-service markets coupled with auction theory. The authors in [15, 16] consider variants of the problem of mechanism design for electricity markets, while [17] discusses a game theoretic characterization of market power in power markets. Among the numerous market mechanisms, energy markets based on the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [18] [19] [20] have been previously explored in [21] [22] [23] . Such a mechanism maximizes a pre-defined global cost (e.g., social welfare of all stakeholders), while allowing individual agents to behave as per their private interests.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We present two approaches for procurement and pricing of virtual inertia units: the centralized problem formulation, which is considered as an efficiency benchmark, and the market-based approach. Both these constructions cater to long-term planning as well as the day-ahead scenarios. Though the centralized approach seems appealing due to its efficiency, it is quite idealistic for all participating agents need to report their true cost curves to the system operator. This exposes us to the concern of inflated reporting of cost curves, which leads to unjustified profits for the agents. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose a mechanism, where the operator-agents arrive at the solution through a market. Under the specific framework of VCG payments, our market mechanism incentivizes the agents to participate (by guaranteeing non-negative payoffs) and to report their true cost curves-as the optimal bidding strategies. We also recover the efficiency of our benchmark solution, as the two procurement problems coincide, maximizing a social welfare objective. The mechanism is rendered novel due to the nature of the problem we concentrate on. The social welfare objective is a linear combination of costs accounting for the worst-case post-fault dynamic response of the power network and the costs of procuring virtual inertia. Our analytic results rest on a deliberately stylized power system model and an H 2 frequency performance criterion, though they can be extended (numerically) to more detailed models and other performance indices as long as the underlying optimization problems can be solved efficiently.
The remainder of this section introduces some notation. Section 2 motivates our system model, revisits some previously established results on H 2 norm based coherency metrics. Section 3 introduces the different costs associated with virtual inertia and provides a benchmark procurement problem. Such a problem admits a solution which maximizes a measure of social welfare. Section 4 presents an efficient market-based setup for inertia procurement. Section 5 presents a case study and simulations on a three-region network, where we compare the market-based and classic regulatory approaches. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notation We denote the n-dimensional vectors of all ones and zeros by 1 n and 0 n . Given an index set I with cardinality |I| and a real-valued array {x 1 , . . . , x |I| }, we denote by x ∈ R |I| the vector obtained by stacking the scalars x i and by diag{x i } the associated diagonal matrix. The vector e i is the i-th vector of the canonical basis for R n .
Problem Formulation
In this section we present our power system model and integral-quadratic H 2 performance criterion for frequency stability. We consider a power system model consisting of network-reduced swing equations accounting for the dynamics of synchronous machines and virtual inertia devices as in [7] [8] [9] [10] . This coarse-grain model for the power system frequency dynamics together with the H 2 metric allows us to derive our market mechanism in an analytic and insightful fashion. We remark that the results in this paper hold equally true when considering higher-order models of synchronous machines and inertia-emulating power converters as in [12] and also for other performance metrics [9] [10] [11] as long as the underlying optimization problems can be solved efficiently.
System Modeling
Consider a power network modeled by a graph with nodes (buses) V = {1, . . . , n} and edges (transmission lines) E ⊆ V ×V. Next, we consider a small-signal version of a networkreduced power system model [24] , where passive loads are modeled as constant impedances and eliminated via Kron reduction [25] , and the network is reduced to the sources i ∈ {1,. . . , n} with linearized dynamics. The assumptions of identical unit voltage magnitudes, purely inductive lines, and a small signal approximation [24] result in
where p in,i refers to the net (i.e., electrical and mechanical) nodal power input, b ij ≥ 0 is the susceptance between nodes {i, j} ∈ E. If bus i only hosts a single synchronous machine, then (1) describes the electromechanical swing dynamics for the generator rotor angle θ i [24] , m i > 0 is the generator's rotational inertia, and d i > 0 accounts for frequency damping or primary speed droop control (neglecting ramping limits). The renewable energy sources interfaced via power electronic inverters [26] too are compatible in this set up. For such an interconnection, θ i is the voltage phase angle, d i > 0 is the droop control coefficient, and m i > 0 either accounts for power measurement time constant [27] , or arises from virtual inertia emulation through a dedicated controlled device [2] [3] [4] , or is simply a control gain [28] . Finally, the dynamics (1) may also arise from frequency-dependent or actively controlled frequency-responsive loads [29] . In general, each bus i may host an ensemble of these devices, and the quantities m i and d i are lumped parametrizations of their aggregate behavior.
We wish to characterize the response of the interconnected system to disturbances in the nodal power injections, possibly representing faults, disconnection of loads or generators, intermittent demand, or fluctuating power generation from renewable sources as in [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 30] . To do so, we consider the linear power system model (1) driven by the inputs p in,i parametrized as p in,i = ζ i 1 2 η i . In this parametrization, η i is a normalized disturbance, and the diagonal matrix Z = diag{ζ i } encodes the information about the strength of the disturbance at different buses, and therefore, describes also the location of the disturbance. We can obtain the state-space model for this linearized system as
where M = diag{m i } and D = diag{d i } are the diagonal matrices of inertia and damping/droop coefficients, and L ∈ R n×n is the symmetric network susceptance matrix. The states (θ, ω) ∈ R 2n are the stacked vectors of angles and frequencies (deviations from the nominal values). Note that
T is the right eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue zero.
To gauge the robustness of a power system to disturbances, we study generalized energy functions as metrics [12] , e.g., a quadratic function of the angle differences and frequency displacements with non-negative weights α ij , β i :
The performance metric (2) can be expressed as the timeintegral ∞ 0 y(t) y(t) dt for a suitably defined output
where N is the Laplacian matrix of the graph induced by α ij , and S is a diagonal matrix collecting β i . Note that by construction, the matrix C is such that C[1
. The above performance metric can be interpreted as the energy amplification of the output y (resp., its steady-state total variance) for impulsive disturbances η (resp., unit variance white noise in a stochastic setting) and is commonly referred to as the squared H 2 norm. The suitability of this metric to describe the stability and robustness of the system after a fault is discussed in [7, 12] .
H 2 norm calculation
In this subsection, we recall a tractable approach for computing the energy metric presented in the previous subsection. Lemma 1. (H 2 norm via observability Gramian) Consider the state-space system G(A, B, C) defined above, with
where P ∈ R 2n×2n is the observability Gramian, uniquely defined by the following Lyapunov equation and an additional constraint:
It is known that the existence of the solution to (5) depends on the positive semi-definiteness of C T C. Furthermore, from [7, 31] , we conclude that the solution P is unique under the constraint (6) . This result generalizes the uniqueness of P , as in [7] , to any positive semidefinite matrix C T C. Lemma 1 allows us to analyze the generalized energy function (2) via an elegant H 2 norm optimization problem.
Virtual inertia and post-fault behavior
The minimization of (4) through a suitable choice of inertia coefficients m i attenuates the energy amplifications due to disturbances. It should be noted that the H 2 norm is a function of both the spatial distribution of the inertia m in the grid, and the location and strengths of the disturbances ζ (through the input matrix B and the cost function C T C).
The performance metric (2) computed as in (4)- (6) is generally non-convex in the inertia parameter m. Further, a meaningful metric which singles out the effect of inertia on the post-fault frequency response is desirable. The choice of N = 0, S = D in (2), (3) simultaneously tackles both these concerns. The ensuing performance metric
penalizes the frequency excursions at each node via the primary control effort d i ω i in (1) that is needed to restore frequency stability. This cost function is also justified from a system operator's viewpoint as significant resources are employed to contain frequency violations through droop control which is effectively captured here. We note that a penalty on primary control effort is also (and especially) meaningful when considering more detailed higher-order power system models [12] where the optimal control strategy trades-off already existing droop control and additional costly inertia emulation. Finally, this metric admits a closed-form expression of the squared H 2 norm via Lemma 1 which is convex in inertia m, i.e.,
where ζ i , m i are the disturbance strength, inertia at node i respectively. We refer the reader to [7] for a detailed proof.
In the subsequent sections we shall focus on the primary control effort for further analysis. However, this choice is not particularly restrictive, as investigating a convex upper bound (we refer the reader to Remark 1) for generic cost functions (2) leads to a comparable analysis and similar results. As discussed in Section 2.1, the disturbance strengths ζ encode the specific location of a disturbance. However, as grid specifications necessitate performance guarantees against all possible contingencies, it is appropriate to consider a robust performance metric accounting for the worstcase disturbance. We can incorporate such worst-case requirements by exploiting the linearity of the performance metric in ζ (independent of the choice of penalties N , S). We denote by Z, the convex hull of the set collecting all the possibly occurring disturbances. As a representative, we consider the following normalized set for the rest of the paper
Let F(m) be the worst-case performance, over the set of normalized-disturbances in Z, i.e.,
As Y(m, ζ) is linear in ζ, the maximization problem (9) can be reformulated as a tractable minimization problem, which for the primary control effort (7) is given by
where ρ is the dual multiplier associated with the inequality budget constraint (8) on the disturbances.
Remark 1 (Convex upper-bound). For a generic H
, where, ζ = max i {ζ i }, d = min i {d i }, and L † is the pseudoinverse of the network Laplacian L. We can evaluate the worst-case upper bound on performance as
Alternatively, this bound can be expressed as
which is strikingly parallel to (10).
Centralized Planning Problem for Inertia
In this section, we motivate the inertia planning problem from the system operator's context. Consider a setting, wherein the operator acquires virtual inertia units from multiple service providers, with the provision of more than one bidder per bus. A possible regulatory solution involves sourcing units proportional to their capacity from each agent. This may however be uneconomical, as virtual inertia units may be dissimilar, based on the underlying technology, and may not have identical costs. In order to make a more informed choice, it is therefore necessary to consider the costs entailed for virtual inertia provision by these units. These costs can be broadly categorized as (i) installation costs: incurred for procurement of the energy storage and the power converter interfaces (ii) maintenance and overhead costs: incurred for the regular upkeep of the storage devices to keep them operational (iii) opportunity costs: as multiple ancillary services can be provided engaging the same resources, the opportunity costs account for the next best alternative forgone by providing inertia support. We conflate the aforementioned costs into c(m), a convex non-decreasing function accounting for the lumped cost of m.
The system operator, now equipped with the cost information, determines the virtual inertia allocation by optimizing system performance in an economical manner. Mathematically, this translates to solving the following optimization problem, where, F(m) is the worst-case performance metric as in (10), m 0 is the stacked vector of existing inertia coefficients at the nodes, K i is the total number of service providers at node i, K = K 1 ∪ . . . ∪ K n is the total number of service providers/agents, µ k is the virtual inertia obtained
where, m(µ) is defined such that
We model the capacity constraints of each agent via (11b), where µ k accounts for the maximum inertia allocation from agent k. In the following, we shall use µ ∈ M as a shorthand for the constraints (11b).
The solution to (11) is the allocation that maximizes the social welfare, by virtue of minimizing the worst-case coherency metric (10) and the cost of virtual inertia. Such an allocation is inherently efficient, and constitutes the benchmark solution to the virtual inertia procurement problem. The centralized problem (11) and the variations thereof have been studied in [7, 9, 12] . However, in liberalized energy markets, the cost functions c k (µ k ) are private information of each agent, and therefore the system operator can not directly solve (11) . We consider such a framework in the next section.
Remark 2 (Planning and day-ahead scenarios). Both the centralized inertia procurement problem (11) and the market-based approach (that we will advocate in Section 4) can be considered on two operational time-scales. If analyzed in a long-term planning framework, virtual inertia is predominantly employed to counteract the ill-effects of integrating renewables, coupled with a planned phasing-out of synchronous machines. On the other hand, in a day-ahead scenario, virtual inertia is deployed for frequency support in case of time-varying inertia profiles [8] , incidental redispatches, and anticipated fluctuations.
A Market Mechanism for Inertia
In this section, we consider a market-based procurement approach, inspired by ancillary service markets. In such a setting, the power system regulator devises a market mechanism-where the system operator invites bids for virtual inertia in lieu of a fair compensation to the agents providing the service. The additional burden is eventually borne by the end consumers. The objectives that govern the design of such a mechanism are: (i) safeguard against the agents benefiting from reporting inflated bids; (ii) ensure that the resulting payments incentivize agents to participate in the auction and assure non-negative returns; (iii) guarantee the efficiency of the benchmark centralized planning problem discussed in Section 3.
VCG Market Mechanism
The auction theory literature is rich with mechanisms proposed to incentivize the participation of agents, and prohibit exorbitant bidding. A particularly popular one, which respects both the requirements, is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [18] [19] [20] . In this paper, we assume that the regulator adopts this well-established design mechanism.
The system operator floats an auction to procure virtual inertia for buses i ∈ V. We denote by k ∈ K, the different service providers/agents who participate in the auction. Each bidder simultaneously submits non-decreasing and convex bidding curves b k (µ k ) such that b k (0) = 0, together with the margins on the maximum (µ k ) virtual inertia that can be provided. En lieu of (11), the system operator determines the allocation vector µ VCG , for individual bids b k (µ k ) for each service provider k, by solving the optimization problem
We recall that F(m(µ)) is convex in m (therefore, also in µ). The optimal allocation from (13) which concurrently minimizes the worst-case coherency metric (10), by choosing from the lowest of available bids is therefore unique.
The agents k ∈ K receive a commensurate compensation for the virtual inertia µ k they provide, according to the VCG payment rule. This is known a priori to both the operator and bidders. The payment made to agent k translates to its externality, i.e., the difference of the system costs when agent k is absent from the auction and the cost when agent k's contribution is excluded.
Let µ VCG-k be the vector of optimal allocations of agents, when agent k abstains from the auction. This corresponds to the solution of the same optimization problem (13) , with the same bids, however, with the constraint set M −k := M ∩ (µ k = 0), accounting for the absence of k, i.e.,
The payment p VCG k to agent k is therefore computed as
where we recall that µ VCG and µ VCG-k are defined in (13) and (14) respectively.
The market mechanism is completely defined by the map that dictates the allocations µ k and the payments p k , given the bids b k collected from the agents. Figure 1 illustrates the operator-agent mechanism, where we make the allocations µ(b) and the payments p(b) explicit functions of the bids.
Optimal bidding strategy of the agents
Each agent k aims to choose its bidding curve b k (µ k ) strategically, in order to maximize individual utility, which is a measure of the monetary surplus accrued. This utility function u k , is computed as the difference between the payment and the investment costs, i.e., the utility evaluated when (17) and depends also on all other agents' bids. In the following, we formalize a few of these notions via game-theoretic definitions [32] before proceeding to the main result.
Nash equilibrium: In a non-cooperative game theoretic setting, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for the players, such that a unilateral deviation by any participant (strategies of other players unchanged) does not result in any gain in the pay-off. For the game under consideration, this translates to a set of bids (b * 1 , . . . , b * n ) being a Nash equilibrium, if for all k the utility
where the bids b k , b −k are the bids of agent k and other agents excluding k, respectively. Dominant strategy: A strategy for any player is said to be dominant, if irrespective of what the other players do, the pay-off is larger than any other of its strategies. This is a stronger result than a Nash equilibrium strategy, as it is alien to the strategies of other players. For the game considered above, this translates to a bid b * k being a dominant strategy for agent k, if the utility is maximized, i.e.,
Incentive-compatibility: A mechanism is said to be incentive-compatible if every player maximizes its pay-off by bidding true costs b k = c k , i.e.,
Observe that an incentive-compatible mechanism results in a dominant strategy (and thus also a Nash equilibrium) with truthful bids b * k = c k . For the market setup in Figure 1 , we investigate suitable bidding strategies for the agents to maximize their utilities, in the theorem below. A mechanism additionally ensuring non-negative utilities is said to be individually rational.
Theorem 1. (VCG-based inertia auction)
Consider the market setup described in Section 4.1, and defined by the allocation function µ VCG in (13) and the payment function p VCG in (15) . Then for every agent k, (i) the VCG mechanism is incentive-compatible,
(ii) the utilities of the agents and payments made to the agents are non-negative, (iii) and the allocation µ VCG (c) is efficient, i.e., solves the social welfare maximization problem (11).
Proof. In the following we use µ * as a shorthand for µ VCG , andμ as a shorthand for µ VCG-k . We have from (13),
where, µ
As before, let µ VCG-k be the vector of optimal allocations of agents, when agent k abstains from the auction. We have,
where,μ(b)=µ VCG-k (b) is a function of the bids (b −k ). The individual payment to each agent k as per the VCG payment rule (15) is
Each agent maximizes individual utility with the local optimization problem for agent k as in (16) . At the optimal allocation (µ VCG , p VCG ), with bids (b k , b −k ), the utility of agent k is
We recall from (12) that m is a function of µ. Hence, we can express m(µ * (b)) as a function of µ * (b). Furthermore, we know from (16) that the agents desire to maximize individual utilities through an optimal bid b k , preferably, independent of b −k .
Note that the first term in (21), B(μ(b), b) is the objective evaluated at the optimizer obtained in (19) . Via the constraint µ k = 0 and bid characteristic b k (0) = 0, we conclude that the term B(μ(b), b) is independent of (b k , µ k ). The utility u k in (20) is therefore maximized when the second term
From (18), note that
Therefore, by changing arguments from b k to c k we get
From equations (22), (23), (24), and for the truthful bid
The above argument applies to each agent k. Hence, bidding the true cost b k = c k is a dominant strategy, and thus also a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, as this bid b k = c k , is independent of the choice of the bids of other agents b −k , such a mechanism is incentive-compatible.
The utility function of agent k when all agents bid true costs, u *
where c = (c k , c −k ). As the first term B(μ(c), c) is evaluated over a smaller constraint set M −k , it is always larger than or equal to the second term B(µ * (c), c). Consequently, it follows that bidding one's true cost also results in nonnegative utilities u * k ≥ 0 and thus also non-negative payments p VCG k (c) ≥ 0 from (16) . As each agent bids the true cost, the problems (13) and (11) coincide. Hence, the optimal allocation µ VCG (c) minimizes the social cost in the centralized problem (11) and maximizes social welfare. This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 establishes that under the framework proposed in Figure 1 , the agents maximize their respective utilities by bidding their true cost functions. Such a characteristic is desirable in order to prevent agents from accumulating windfall gains by reporting inflated bids.
Remark 3 (Alternate problem formulation). The planning problem (11) can alternatively be posed as minimizing costs subject to meeting certain performance guarantees. In such a framework, the optimization problem translates to
where, F is a pre-specified performance guarantee which the system operator desires to meet. Observe that upon dualizing the constraint (25b) with a Lagrange multiplier γ, we obtain
The inner minimization problem corresponds to the original problem formulation (11). The outer maximization problem, on the other hand, is a tractable scalar optimization problem that can be solved via standard iterative procedures. As the optimal bidding strategy has been shown to be independent of γ in Theorem 1, the same bids can be used in all iterations of the outer maximization problem.
Remark 4 (Generality of the result). Although we present a particular instance here, based on a coarse-grain swing equation model and an H 2 performance metric, Theorem 1 also holds true for more general system models and other performance metrics F(m(µ)), as long as the arg min of the expressions (13), (14) are unique and can be evaluated.
Numerical Case Study
In this section, we present a few illustrations which support the preceding discussions on the centralized planning problem and the market-based auction mechanism. A 12-bus case study depicted in Figure 2 is considered. The system parameters are based on a modified two-area system from [29, Example 12.6] with an additional third area, as introduced in [10] . We assume that each node is enabled to receive virtual inertia contributions from a number of dissimilar agents. 
Simulation setup
The alternate formulation presented in Remark 3 was examined for the case study in Figure 2 . This setup enables us to impose guarantees on the worst-case performance via (25b). Further, we note that the constraint (25b) requires solving a maximization problem over the disturbance set (8) . This can however be circumvented by rewriting the maximization inequality as a set of inequality constraints. We express (25b) from (7), (9) as
The linearity of (27a) in ζ dictates that the maximum can be obtained by evaluating the objective at the vertices of the polytope given by (27b)-(27c), i.e., (27) is equivalent to the set of inequality constraints given by
The resulting set of constraints from (28) is linear in the decision variables µ and can be directly incorporated in the optimization problem (26) . For the purpose of simulations, we set the performance guarantee F = 0.29. This choice of F requires virtual inertia allocation at the buses labeled 2, 4, 8, 12. In Figure 3 , we plot the inertia profiles and the worst-case performance. The robust optimal allocation problem yields a valley-filling profile as in [7] which renders all buses identical with respect to the expected disturbance.
Simulation results
As proposed earlier, virtual inertia at each bus can be contributed by a number of agents. In our example, we consider 3, 7, 3, 2 agents connected to buses numbered 2, 4, 8, 12 respectively, and labeled as 2a . . . 2c, 4a . . . 4g, 8a . . . 8c, 12a, 12b. Further, we assume that the maximum inertia that each agent can contribute is given by the stacked vector µ max = [20, 40, 60, 20, 40, 20, 40, 20, 40, 20, 20, 40, 60, 20, 40] . We recall from Section 4.1 that the bids and costs can be expressed as non-decreasing convex curves, and consider a special subset of linear functions, i. Figure 4 , we compare the allocations and total procurement costs for three mechanisms: a possible regulatory allocation (where inertia is allocated proportional to capacity in order to meet the specifications, regardless of cost), market-based (Figure 1 ), and centralized (11) mechanism. Each allocation meets the performance requirement in (27) . The optimal allocations and the costs for the centralized and market-based mechanisms coincide. The regulatory strategy does not factor for the cost-curves of the agents, and therefore results in a higher overall cost. Figure 5 plots the average VCG-based payments (payment received per unit of virtual inertia) and average costs (cost per unit of virtual inertia) for each agent. Note that the agents 2b, 4e, 8c, 12b do not provide any virtual inertia. The average payment for each agent connected to the same node is identical. However, the cheapest providers are preferred, and receive a payment that can be larger than their cost (which is also their bid). Ultimately, the utility (difference between payment and cost incurred) of each agent depends on the cost curves of all the agents that are co-located at the same bus.
In Figure 6 , we illustrate that bidding the true cost is a dominant strategy. Without loss of generality, agent 2b with a true cost c 2b = 5 is considered. Five random bid profiles are generated for the rest of the agents, and the utility of agent 2b is plotted as a function of its own bid. Observe that the agent maximizes its utility for a bid equaling its true cost, regardless of the bids of others.
Conclusions
We considered the problem of economic, incentivized procurement of virtual inertia in power grids. A robust performance metric penalizing frequency excursions through damping coefficients was considered. Two schemes for virtual inertia procurement were introduced and analyzed. In contrast to the centralized planning approach, the proposed market-based decentralized mechanism adequately compensated the agents for their contribution. Such a decentralized approach also resulted in an inertia allocation which maximized the social welfare of the centralized setting. This mechanism was partially inspired by the ancillary service markets and followed a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. The agents with the most economical bids benefited and the performance limits imposed by the coherency metric were respected. Such a scheme also enforced truthful bidding by the agents and achieved incentive compatibility, and nonnegative utilities. We finally presented an illustration for a case study underscoring the benefits of such a mechanism. With more renewable integration in the power grids, virtual inertia is poised for a greater role, and the issues of economical procurement and markets for this service will gain further prominence. We believe that such decentralized auction mechanisms which result in social welfare through truthful bidding by competitive bidders will gain traction. An open problem which remains to be addressed relates to shill-bidding and collusion of agents, which has not been considered here.
